For Netanyahu, avoiding a peace agreement can now be worse than accepting it

He promised a total victory for Israel, but standing next to Donald Trump in the White House on Monday, it was Benjamin Netanyahu who looked defeated.

The Prime Minister of Israel said all the good things about the peace agreement he had just accepted, but he seemed deflated, his hoarse voice and his energy sized, when he praised Trump as “the greatest friend that Israel has ever had in the White House”.

It is a friendship that could cost him his government.

Netanyahu’s far -right allies have threatened to leave – and possibly collapse – from his government if he makes too many concessions to end the war. Coalition partners such as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir have little secret of their desire to annex Gaza, to chase the Palestinians and to restore Jewish colonies there.

They – and Netanyahu – were implacally opposed to any role for the Palestinian authority in Gaza, and any way to a Palestinian state. The Netanyahu agreement has now agreed to describe the two, but with heavy warnings.

Trump knows that by pushing the Israeli Prime Minister in this agreement, he asked him to risk his government. In return, he balances the prospect of a historical heritage – a new future more peaceful for the region and new links between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

There were signs, even before Netanyahu leaves for Washington, that he knew that this choice was going to happen.

The president of Israel, Isaac Herzog, told an Israeli radio station which he planned to forgive Netanyahu in the corruption affairs that he was currently faced in court. These trials are one of the reasons, according to his criticism, that he hesitated to leave his duties and to face the judges without the shield of his national functions, his power and his profile.

But the political exit offered to him at the moment – a regional heritage in exchange for the abandonment of his government, and perhaps his political career – does not seem to have completely won it.

His first response to his compatriots was to publicly emphasize that he did not, in fact, accepted a Palestinian state.

“Absolutely not. It is not even written in the agreement,” he said in response to a question on the camera. “But we said one thing – that we would force a Palestinian state forcibly.”

Reports in the Israeli media also suggest that the Israeli cabinet will not vote for the entire agreement – but only on the exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners.

The question is to know what these actions mean about his political calculation: if Netanyahu tries to maintain his government long enough to work on his political magic on polls, which currently predict that he would lose an election, or if he sets up on Hamas rejecting this agreement – or would not be able to control his commanders on the ground in Gaza – and that the war will not stop at all.

The potential continuation of the war was something he stressed in this uncomfortable press conference in Washington, emphasizing – with the support of Trump – that Israel would have freely reigned to “finish work” if Hamas did not deliver on its side. Given this day, this uncomfortable moment could be the price of continuous American support for his war.

Netanyahu is known as a master of political maneuvers, putting on a path between political roadblocks to buy time. He moved the position during the previous negotiations and led by previous ceasefire agreements, to retreat when a permanent end to war is to be discussed.

Many believe that he never wanted to negotiate the end of this war, but to force Hamas to go to the conditions of Israel. But it is difficult to maintain this without compromise image of the “total victory” when you have publicly conceded to the very things that you have spent a career to prevent and when you expect your enemy’s response.

For the first time since the start of the war, it seems that the consequences of avoiding this agreement were worse than the consequences of acceptance. And if Trump really forced her to choose between his ally in Washington and his allies at home, why did Joe Biden do the same when a similar case was on the table nine months ago-and some 30,000 additional gas were still alive?