Twenty years ago, my research revealed one of the greatest corporate scandals in American history: he taught me that fraud is everywhere, just waiting to be revealed

I never intended to be a denunciator. I simply did what academics are trained to do: ask questions, follow the data and let evidence speak. But what the evidence revealed was amazing: the leaders of hundreds of companies manipulated the dates of subsidy of purchasing options to enrich their executives at the expense of shareholders. The practice has become known as the rescue.

Now, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of this research, I see disturbing parallels emerging in other corners of the financial world.

A model too precise to be lucky

My trip to this disturbing corporate behavior corner began with the desire to understand how leaders’ remuneration influenced business decisions. During the analysis of large sets of remuneration data and share courses, I noticed something particular: the grants of action options often coincided with the recent decreases in the company’s action. Too often.

The model was statistically improbable. It was as if the leaders had a crystal ball, receiving options several times at the most appropriate time. But the truth was more banal and more disturbing. The companies retroactively selected the dates of grants which coincided with the prices of low actions, effectively locking instant and unprecedented gains. This allowed managers to buy actions at a discount while maintaining the illusion they had to win the discount by increasing the share price.

The simplicity of the scheme

What made fraud so insidious is its simplicity. Backdating did not require complex financial engineering or developed concealations. It was a quiet manipulation of paperwork – which made a date in the past when the course of the action was low and claims that it was the day the options were granted.

This simplicity has probably contributed to its spread. There are evidence that individuals on several tips have been transmitted in practice. But even isolated executives and directors could easily design the program, just like someone in return for a check to reveal that they paid an invoice in time.

Viewed

What struck me the most was that the decline went unnoticed for at least a decade. It was a silent epidemic of opportunism. Options grant data was public. Thousands of participants were involved. Some listeners must have seen isolated traces of fraud. But no one connected the points.

My research, combined with a timely boost, ultimately prompted the dry to launch targeted surveys. Journalists followed, including a team at The Wall Street Journal Over time, resources and incentives to continue history. Their work has earned its first Pulitzer price in the newspaper for the public service.

Parallels in other scandals

Since then, I have seen parallels backwards in other financial scandals. For example, backup is not the only fraud that depends on the simple fact of choosing prices in the past. The infamous Ponzi program by Bernie Madoff has used trades made according to expired prices. Remarkably, Madoff’s investors have accepted these reports for years, despite the improbability of returns. Similarly, the delatedly investment fund scandal allowed favored customers to illegally negotiate common investment funds in the evening at expired prices from the end of the negotiation day.

These cases show how easier it is to perform well when you can go back in time and choose a favorable moment to act.

Today, I fear that a similar dynamic will take place in investment capital. Many funds declare assessments based on internal or third estimates shortly after the acquisition of assets. These evaluations often seem swollen – sometimes even recognized as such by the companies themselves. However, these funds are increasingly included in retirement portfolios, exposing daily investors at risk – and potentially in fraud – they may not fully understand.

The paradox of corporate fraud

It is the paradox of corporate fraud: it is both obvious and invisible. The data is often there. The models are detectable. But with the silent authors, the deception persists.

What gives me hope is that our tools to detect fraud are more powerful than ever. We have better data, sharper analytical methods and an increasing community of skeptical surveillance dogs.

Because the following scandal will not be stopped by regulators alone. He will be stopped by someone who notices a model, asks a question and refuses to look away.

The opinions expressed in the Fortune.com comments are only the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.